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1 Research ﬁnanced by a Ph.D. Grant of the InstituWe consider immediate predictive inference, where a subject, using a number of observa-
tions of a ﬁnite number of exchangeable random variables, is asked to coherently model his
beliefs about the next observation, in terms of a predictive lower prevision. We study when
such predictive lower previsions are representation insensitive, meaning that they are
essentially independent of the choice of the (ﬁnite) set of possible values for the random
variables. We establish that such representation insensitive predictive models have very
interesting properties, and show that among such models, the ones produced by the Impre-
cise Dirichlet-Multinomial Model are quite special in a number of ways. In the Conclusion,
we discuss the open question as to how unique the predictive lower previsions of the
Imprecise Dirichlet-Multinomial Model are in being representation insensitive.
 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Consider a subject who is making N > 0 successive observations of a certain phenomenon. We represent these observa-
tions by N random variables X1; . . . ;XN . By random variable, we mean a variable about whose value the subject may entertain
certain beliefs. We assume that at each successive instant k, the actual value of the random variables Xk can be determined in
principle. To ﬁx ideas, our subject might be looking for frogs in the Amazon forest, and then Xk is the species of the kth frog he
comes across. Or, he might, as an archetypical example, be drawing balls without replacement from an urn, in which case Xk
could designate the color of the kth ball taken from the urn.. All rights reserved.
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made previously, i.e., those up to a certain instant n 2 f0;1; . . . ;N  1g, to predict, or make inferences about, the values of the
future, or as yet unmade, observations Xnþ1, . . ., XN . Here, we only consider the problem of immediate prediction: he is only
trying to predict, or make inferences about, the value of the next observation Xnþ1.
We are particularly interested in the problem of making such predictive inferences under prior ignorance: initially, before
making any observation, our subject knows very little or nothing about what produces these observations. In the urn example, this
is the situation where he does not know the composition of the urn, e.g., how many balls there are, or what their colors are.
What we do assume, however, is that our subject makes an assessment of exchangeability to the effect that the order in which
a sequence of observations has been made does not matter for his predictions.
In such a situation, a subject usually determines, beforehand, a non-empty ﬁnite set X of possible values, also called cat-
egories for the random variables Xk. It is then sometimes held, especially by advocates of a logical interpretation to proba-
bility, that our subject’s beliefs should be represented by some given family of predictive probability mass functions. Such a
predictive family is made up of real-valued maps pnþ1X ð j xÞ on X, which give, for each n ¼ 0; . . . ;N  1 and each
x ¼ ðx1; . . . ; xnÞ in Xn, the so-called predictive probability mass function for the ðnþ 1Þth observation, given the values
ðX1; . . . ;XnÞ ¼ ðx1; . . . ; xnÞ ¼ x of the n previous observations. Any such family should in particular reﬂect the above-
mentioned exchangeability assessment. Cases in point are the Laplace–Bayes Rule of Succession in the case of two
categories [1], or Carnap’s more general k-calculus [2].
The inferences in Carnap’s k-calculus, to give but one example, can strongly depend on the number of elements in the
set X. This may well be considered undesirable. If for instance, we consider drawing balls from an urn, predictive infer-
ences about whether the next ball will be ‘red or green’ ideally should not depend on whether we assume beforehand
that the possible categories are ‘red’, ‘green’, ‘blue’ and ‘any other color’, or whether we take them to be ‘red or green’,
‘blue’, ‘yellow’ and ‘any other color’. This desirable property was called representation invariance by Peter Walley [3],
who showed that it is satisﬁed by the so-called Imprecise Dirichlet-Multinomial Model (or IDMM for short [4]). The IDMM
can be seen as a special system of predictive lower previsions and it is a (predictive) cousin of the parametric Imprecise
Dirichlet Model (or IDM [3]). Lower previsions are behavioral belief models that generalize the more classical Bayesian
ones, such as probability mass functions, or previsions. We assume that the reader is familiar with the basic aspects
of the theory of coherent lower previsions [5]. Relatively short introductions can be found in papers by Walley [6]
and by ourselves [7,8].
Here, we intend to study general systems of such predictive lower previsions. In Section 2, we give a general deﬁnition of
such predictive systems and study a number of properties they can satisfy, such as coherence and exchangeability. In Section 3,
we study the property of representation insensitivity for predictive systems, which is a stronger version of Walley’s repre-
sentation invariance, tailored to making inferences under prior ignorance. We show in Section 4 that there are representa-
tion insensitive and exchangeable predictive systems, by giving two examples. These two can be used to generate so-called
mixing predictive systems, which are studied in Section 5. Among these mixing predictive systems, the ones corresponding
to an IDMM take a special place, as they are the only ones to satisfy all the above-mentioned properties and an extra one, called
speciﬁcity, related to behavior under conditioning. In the Conclusions, we list a number of interesting, as yet unresolved,
questions. We have gathered proofs in an Appendix.2. Predictive families and systems
2.1. Families of predictive lower previsions
First assume that, before the subject starts making the observations Xk, he ﬁxes a non-empty and ﬁnite set X of possible
values for all the random variables Xk. We now want to represent his beliefs about the value of the ðnþ 1Þth
observation Xnþ1, if he came to observe the sequence of values x ¼ ðx1; . . . ; xnÞ 2 Xn for the ﬁrst n random variables, or in
other words, if he came to know that Xk ¼ xk for k ¼ 1; . . . ;n. The model we propose for this is a lower prevision
Pnþ1X ð j xÞ on the set LðXÞ of all gambles on X. Let us ﬁrst make clear what this means.
A gamble f on X is a real-valued map on X. It represents an uncertain reward, expressed in terms of some predetermined
linear utility scale. When interpreted as a gamble on the outcome Xnþ1, it yields a (possibly negative) reward of f ðxÞ utiles if
the value of the next variable Xnþ1 turns out to be the category x in X. The set of all gambles on X is denoted byLðXÞ. The
lower prevision Pnþ1X ðf j xÞ of any gamble f on X is the subject’s supremum acceptable price for buying this gamble, or in other
words, the highest r such that he accepts the uncertain reward f ðXnþ1Þ  p for all p < r, conditional on his having observed
the values x ¼ ðx1; . . . ; xnÞ for the ﬁrst n variables ðX1; . . . ;XnÞ. His corresponding predictive upper prevision, or inﬁmum selling
price for f, is then given by the conjugacy relationship: Pnþ1X ðf j xÞ ¼ Pnþ1X ðf j xÞ.
A speciﬁc class of gambles is related to events, i.e., subsets A of X. This is the class of indicators IA that map any element
of A to one and all other elements ofX to zero. A lower prevision that is deﬁned on (indicators of) events only is called a lower
probability, and we often write Pnþ1X ðA j xÞ instead of Pnþ1X ðIA j xÞ. The reader may wonder at this point why we work with the
seemingly more complicated language of gambles and lower previsions, rather than with that of events and lower probabil-
ities. The main reason is that, as Walley has shown [5], the former is much more expressive: in contradistinction with a
coherent prevision, a coherent lower prevision is not completely characterized by the values it assumes on events.
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the observations ðX1; . . . ;XnÞ ¼ x, we mean the real-valued functional, deﬁned on the set of all gamblesLðXÞ, that assigns to
any gamble f its predictive lower prevision Pnþ1X ðf j xÞ. We assume that the subject has such a predictive lower prevision
Pnþ1X ð j xÞ for all x in Xn and all n 2 f0; . . . ;N  1g, where N > 0 is some ﬁxed positive integer, representing the maximum
or total number of observations we are interested in. For n ¼ 0, there is some slight abuse of notation here, because we then
actually have an unconditional predictive lower prevision P1X onLðXÞ for the ﬁrst observation X1, and no observations have
yet been made. We are thus led to the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1 (Family of predictive lower previsions). Consider a ﬁnite and non-empty set of categories X. An X-family of
predictive lower previsions, or predictive X-family for short, for up to N > 0 observations is a set of predictive lower previsions
rNX :¼ fPnþ1X ð j xÞ : x 2 Xn and n ¼ 0; . . . ;N  1g.
It is useful to consider the special case, mentioned in the Introduction, and quite common in the literature, of a family of
predictive lower previsions of which all members Pnþ1X ð j xÞ are actually linear or coherent previsions Pnþ1X ð j xÞ, i.e, such that
for each n ¼ 0; . . . ;N  1 and x 2 Xn there is some predictive (probability) mass function pnþ1X ð j xÞ on X such that
pnþ1X ðz j xÞP 0 and
P
z2Xp
nþ1
X ðz j xÞ ¼ 1, and where for all gambles f on X, Pnþ1X ðf j xÞ ¼
P
z2Xf ðzÞpnþ1X ðz j xÞ. Such linear previ-
sions are the Bayesian belief models usually encountered in the literature (see for instance de Finetti’s book [9]). We can use
Bayes’s rule to combine these predictive mass functions into unique joint mass functions pnX on X
n :¼ ni¼1X, given bypnXðxÞ ¼ pnXðx1; . . . ; xnÞ ¼
Yn1
k¼0
pkþ1X ðxkþ1 j x1; . . . ; xkÞfor all x ¼ ðx1; . . . ; xnÞ in Xn and n ¼ 1; . . . ;N. This leads to unique corresponding linear previsions PnX on LðXnÞ, the set of
gambles g on Xn, given byPnXðgÞ ¼
X
x2Xn
gðxÞpnXðxÞ: ð1ÞFor n ¼ N, we call PNX the joint linear prevision associated with the given predictive family of linear previsions. It models be-
liefs about the values that the random variables ðX1; . . . ;XNÞ assume jointly in XN .2.2. Systems of predictive lower previsions
When a subject is using a family of predictive lower previsions rNX, this means he has assumed beforehand that the ran-
dom variables X1; . . . ;XN all take values in the set X. It cannot, therefore, be excluded at this point that his inferences, as rep-
resented by the predictive lower previsions Pnþ1X ð j xÞ, strongly depend on the choice of the set of possible values X. Any
initial choice of Xmay lead to an essentially very different predictive family rNX. In order to be able to deal with this possible
dependence mathematically, we now deﬁne predictive systems as follows.
Deﬁnition 2 (System of predictive lower previsions). Fix N > 0. Consider for any ﬁnite non-empty set of categories X an
X-family rNX of predictive lower previsions P
nþ1
X ð j xÞ. The set rN :¼ frNX : X is a finite and non-empty setg is called a system
of predictive lower previsions, or predictive system for short, for up to N observations. We denote by RN the set of all such
predictive systems.
It is such predictive systems whose properties we intend to study. For two predictive systems rN and kN we say that rN is
less committal, ormore conservative, than kN , andwe denote this by rN  kN , if each predictive lower prevision Pnþ1X ð j xÞ in rN is
point-wise dominated by the corresponding predictive lower previsionQnþ1X ð j xÞ in kN: Pnþ1X ðf j xÞ 6 Qnþ1X ðf j xÞ for all gambles f
on X. The reason for this terminology should be clear: a subject using predictive system kN will be buying gambles f on X at
supremumpricesQnþ1X ðf j xÞ that are at least as high as the supremumprices Pnþ1X ðf j xÞ of a subject using predictive system rN .
The binary relation  on RN is a partial order: it is reﬂexive, anti-symmetric and transitive. A non-empty subset
frNc : c 2 Cg of RN may have an inﬁmum (or greatest lower bound) with respect to this partial order, and whenever it exists,
this inﬁmum corresponds to taking lower envelopes: if we ﬁxX, n and x, then the corresponding predictive lower prevision in
the inﬁmum predictive system is the lower envelope infc2CPnþ1X;c ð j xÞ of the corresponding predictive lower previsions
Pnþ1X;c ð j xÞ in the predictive systems rNc , c 2 C.2.3. Coherence requirements
As is usually done for belief models, we impose certain consistency, or rationality, requirements on the members
Pnþ1X ð j xÞ of a predictive system rN .
Deﬁnition 3 (Coherence). A system of predictive lower previsions is called coherent if it is the inﬁmum of a collection of
systems of predictive linear previsions.
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and x 2 Xn should satisfy Walley’s (joint) coherence condition.2 Coherence is in the present context3 also equivalent to requir-
ing that the predictive lower previsions Pnþ1X ð j xÞ should be (separately) coherent, meaning that for each ﬁnite and non-empty
set X, n ¼ 0; . . . ;N  1 and x in Xn, Pnþ1X ð j xÞ should satisfy, for all gambles f and g on X and all real kP 0:
(C1) Pnþ1X ðf j xÞP inf f ½accepting sure gains;
(C2) Pnþ1X ðf þ g j xÞP Pnþ1X ðf j xÞ þ Pnþ1X ðg j xÞ ½super-additivity;
(C3) Pnþ1X ðkf j xÞ ¼ kPnþ1X ðf j xÞ ½positive homogeneity.2.4. Exchangeability and regular exchangeability
Next, we show how to formulate an assessment of exchangeability of the random variables X1, . . ., XN in terms of a system
of predictive lower previsions. A subject would make such an assessment if he believed that the order in which these vari-
ables are observed is not important. Let us make this idea more precise.
We begin with the deﬁnition of exchangeability for a precise predictive system, i.e., a system of predictive linear previ-
sions. For each choice ofX, the preciseX-family rNX has a unique joint linear prevision P
N
X onLðXNÞ, deﬁned by Eq. (1), which
describes beliefs about what values the joint random variable ðX1; . . . ;XNÞ assumes in XN . We then call the precise predictive
system exchangeable if all the associated joint linear previsions PNX are. Formally, consider the set of all permutations of
f1; . . . ;Ng. With any such permutation p we can associate a permutation of XN , also denoted by p, that maps any
x ¼ ðx1; . . . ; xNÞ in XN to px :¼ ðxpð1Þ; . . . ; xpðNÞÞ. Similarly, with any gamble f on XN , we can consider the permuted gamble
pf :¼ f p, or in other words ðpf ÞðxÞ¼ f ðpxÞ. We then require that PNXðpf Þ¼ PNXðf Þ for any such permutation p and any gamble f
onXN . Equivalently, in terms of the joint mass function pNX, we require that p
N
XðpxÞ¼pNXðxÞ for all x inXN and all permutations
p. See de Finetti’s work [9,12] for more details and discussion of exchangeability for linear previsions.
We adopt the following deﬁnition of exchangeability for general predictive systems.
Deﬁnition 4 (Exchangeability). A system of predictive lower previsions is called exchangeable if it is the inﬁmum of a
collection of exchangeable systems of predictive linear previsions. We denote by hRNe ;i the set of all exchangeable
predictive systems for up to N observations, with the same order  as deﬁned on hRN ;i.
It follows at once from this deﬁnition that the inﬁmum of any non-empty collection of exchangeable predictive systems is
still exchangeable, as an inﬁmum of inﬁma (and therefore an inﬁmum itself) of collections of exchangeable systems of pre-
dictive linear previsions. This means that the partially ordered set hRNe ;i is a complete semi-lattice [13, Sections 3.19–3.20].
We next turn to a stronger requirement, introduced mainly for reasons of mathematical convenience.
Deﬁnition 5 (Regular exchangeability). A system of predictive lower previsions is called regularly exchangeable if it is the
inﬁmum of some collection rNc , c 2 C, of exchangeable systems of predictive linear previsions, where for all ﬁnite non-emptyX,
all x in XN1, and all c in C, pN1X;c ðxÞ ¼
QN2
k¼0 p
kþ1
X;c ðxkþ1 j x1; . . . ; xkÞ > 0.
The term regular reminds of the notion of regular extension considered byWalley [5, Appendix J]. Regular exchangeability
implies that every predictive lower prevision Pnþ1X ð j xÞ is the lower envelope of the predictive linear previsions Pnþ1X;c ð j xÞ,
uniquely derived from the joint linear previsions PNX;c by applying Bayes’s rule:2 See
Theorem
suggest
3 Thi
coherenPnþ1X;c ðf j xÞ ¼
PNX;cðf IfxgXNn Þ
PNX;cðfxg XNnÞ
; or equivalently pnþ1X;c ðz j xÞ ¼
pnþ1X;c ðx; zÞ
pnX;cðxÞ
;since the probability pnX;cðxÞ :¼ PNX;cðfxg XNnÞ of the conditioning event is non-zero. All regularly exchangeable predictive
systems are in particular also exchangeable and coherent. A precise exchangeable predictive system is regularly exchangeable
if and only if pN1X ðxÞ > 0 for all x 2 XN1 and all ﬁnite non-empty sets X: regular exchangeability is a stricter requirement
than exchangeability.
The number of times TzðxÞ :¼jfk 2 f1; . . . ;ng : xk ¼ zgj that a given category z in X has been observed in some sample
x 2 Xn of length 0 6 n 6 N, is of special importance when there is regular exchangeability. Consider the counting map TX that
maps samples x of length n to the X-tuple TXðxÞ whose components are TzðxÞ, z 2 X. TXðxÞ tells us how often each of the
elements of X appears in the sample x, and as x varies over Xn, TXðxÞ assumes all values in the set of count vectors
NnX :¼ fm 2 NX0 :
P
z2Xmz ¼ ng. Here N0 denotes the set of non-negative integers (including zero). It is easy to see that
any two samples x and y of length n have the same count vector TXðxÞ ¼ TXðyÞ if and only if there is some permutation p
of f1; . . . ;ng such that y ¼ px. This leads to the following result.Walley’s book [5]: Section 6.2 for separate coherence, Section 7.1.4 for (joint) coherence of conditional lower previsions, and Section K3 for Williams’s
. Since the random variables Xk are assumed to only take on a ﬁnite number of values, Walley’s coherence condition here coincides with the one ﬁrst
ed by Williams [10].
s follows from our generalized Marginal Extension Theorem for random variables [11, Theorem 4]: for any random variables X1; . . . ;XN , any separately
t conditional lower previsions P1, P2ð j X1Þ, . . ., PNð j X1; . . . ;XN1Þ are automatically (jointly) coherent.
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in Xn such that TXðxÞ ¼ TXðyÞ. Then pnXðxÞ ¼ pnXðyÞ. And if pnXðxÞ ¼ pnXðyÞ > 0, then Pnþ1X ð j xÞ ¼ Pnþ1X ð j yÞ.
As an immediate corollary, we see that in any regularly exchangeable predictive system, the predictive lower previsions
Pnþ1X ð j xÞ only depend on the sample x through its count vector m ¼ TXðxÞ: for any other sample y such that TXðyÞ ¼ m, it
holds that Pnþ1X ð j xÞ ¼ Pnþ1X ð j yÞ and we use the notation Pnþ1X ð j mÞ for Pnþ1X ð j xÞ in order to reﬂect this. In fact, from now on
we only consider predictive systems—be they regularly exchangeable or not—for which the predictive lower previsions only
depend on the observed samples through their count vectors, or in other words, for which the count vectors are sufﬁcient
statistics.
Regular exchangeability allows us to prove the following inequality, which has far-reaching consequences. We denote
by ez the count vector in N1X whose z-component is one and all of whose other components are zero; it corresponds to
the case where we have a single observation of a category z in X.
Proposition 2. In a regularly exchangeable predictive system rN, it holds for all ﬁnite and non-empty sets X, all 0 6 n 6 N  2,
all m inNnX and all gambles f on X that P
nþ1
X ðf j mÞP Pnþ1X ðPnþ2X ðf j mþ eÞ j mÞ. Here Pnþ2X ðf j mþ eÞ denotes the gamble on X
that assumes the value Pnþ2X ðf j mþ ezÞ in z 2 X.3. Representation invariance and representation insensitivity
We now turn to Walley’s notion of representation invariance; see his IDM paper [3] for detailed discussion and motivation.
Representation invariance could also, and perhaps preferably so, be called pooling invariance. Consider a set of categories X,
and a partition S of X. Each element S of such a partition corresponds to a single new category, that consists of all the ele-
ments x 2 S being pooled, i.e., considered as one. Denote by SðxÞ the unique element of the partitionS that a category x 2 X
belongs to. So we consider S as a map fromX toS. If a gamble g on X does not differentiate between pooled categories, or in
other words, is constant on the elements ofS, this means that there is some gamble f onS such that g ¼ f  S. Similarly, with
a sample x ¼ ðx1; . . . ; xnÞ 2 Xn, there corresponds a sample Sx :¼ ðSðx1Þ; . . . ; SðxnÞÞ 2Sn of pooled categories. We can of course
consider the partition S as a set of categories, and then representation invariance requires that Pnþ1X ðf  S j xÞ ¼ Pnþ1S ðf j SxÞ:
for gambles that do not differentiate between pooled categories, it should not matter whether we consider predictive infer-
ences for the set of original categories X, or for the set of pooled categories S.
Besides pooling invariance, we can also require renaming invariance: as long as no confusion can arise, it should not mat-
ter for a subject’s predictive inferences what names he gives to the different categories. This may seem too trivial to even
mention, and as far as we know, it is always implicitly taken for granted in predictive inference. But it will be well to devote
some attention to it here, in order to distinguish it from the category permutation invariance to be discussed shortly, with
which it is easily confused if we do not pay proper attention. If we have a renaming bijection k between a set of categories X
and a set of renamed categoriesY, where we clearly distinguish between the elements ofX and those ofY, then with a gam-
ble f on the set of renamed categories, there corresponds a gamble f  k on the set of original categories X. Similarly, with a
sample x ¼ ðx1; . . . ; xnÞ of original categories, there corresponds a sample of renamed categories kx :¼ ðkðx1Þ; . . . ; kðxnÞÞ.
Clearly, we should then require that PXðf  k j xÞ ¼ PYðf j kxÞ.
We have already stated in the Introduction that we are especially interested in predictive inference where a subject starts
from a state of prior ignorance. In such a state, he has no reason to distinguish between the different elements of any set of
categories X he has chosen. To formalize this idea, consider a permutation - of the elements of X.4 With any gamble f on X,
there corresponds a permuted gamble f  -. Similarly, with an observed sample x in Xn, there corresponds a permuted sample
-x :¼ ð-ðx1Þ; . . . ;-ðxnÞÞ. If a subject has no reason to distinguish between categories z and their images -z, this means that
Pnþ1X ðf  - j xÞ ¼ Pnþ1X ðf j -xÞ. We call this property category permutation invariance.5 Formally, it closely resembles renaming
invariance, but whereas the latter is a trivial requirement, category permutation invariance can only be justiﬁed when our sub-
ject has no reason to distinguish between the categories, which may for instance happen when he is in a state of prior ignorance.
To draw attention to the difference between the two in a somewhat loose manner: category permutation invariance allows con-
fusion between new and old categories, something which renaming invariance carefully avoids.
We call representation insensitivity the combination of representation, renaming and category permutation invariance. It
means that predictive inferences remain essentially unchanged when we transform the set of categories, or in other words
that they are essentially insensitive to the choice of representation, i.e., category set. It is not difﬁcult to see that represen-
tation insensitivity can be formally characterized as follows. Consider two non-empty and ﬁnite sets of categories X and Y,
and a so-called relabeling map q : X! Y that is onto, i.e., such that Y ¼ qðXÞ :¼ fqðxÞ : x 2 Xg. Then with any gamble f on Y
there corresponds a gamble f  q on X. Similarly, with an observed sample x in Xn, there corresponds a transformed sample
qx :¼ ðqðx1Þ; . . . ; qðxnÞÞ in Yn. Representation insensitivity for immediate prediction then means that Pnþ1X ðf  q j xÞ ¼ Pnþ1Y ðf j qxÞ.4 This permutation - of the elements of X, or in other words of the categories, should be contrasted with the permutation p of the order of the observations,
i.e., of the time set f1; . . . ;Ng, considered in Section 2.4 in order to deﬁne exchangeability.
5 This requirement is related to the notion of (weak) permutation invariance that two of us studied in much detail in a paper [7] dealing with symmetry in
uncertainty modeling.
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For any gamble f on a ﬁnite non-empty set of categoriesX, its range f ðXÞ :¼ ff ðxÞ : x 2 Xg can again be considered as a set
of categories, and f itself can be seen as a relabeling map. With any m inNnX there corresponds a count vector m
f inNnf ðXÞ
deﬁned by mfr :¼
P
f ðxÞ¼rmx for all r in f ðXÞ. Clearly, if x is a sample with count vector m, then the relabeled sample
fx ¼ ðf ðx1Þ; . . . ; f ðxnÞÞ has count vector mf . Representation insensitivity is then equivalent to the following requirement,
which we take as its deﬁnition, because of its simplicity and elegance.
Deﬁnition 6 (Representation insensitivity). A predictive system rN is representation insensitive if for all 0 6 n 6 N  1, all ﬁnite
non-empty sets X and Y, all m 2NnX and m0 2NnY, and all gambles f on X and g on Y such that f ðXÞ ¼ gðYÞ, the following
implication holds: mf ¼ m0g ) Pnþ1X ðf j mÞ ¼ Pnþ1Y ðg j m0Þ.
Clearly, a predictive system rN is representation insensitive if and only if for all ﬁnite and non-empty sets X, all
0 6 n 6 N  1, all m 2NnX and all f 2LðXÞ:6 Ano
which h
generalPnþ1X ðf j mÞ ¼ Pnþ1f ðXÞðidf ðXÞ j mf Þ; ð2Þ
where idf ðXÞ denotes the identity map (gamble) on f ðXÞ. The predictive lower prevision Pnþ1X ðf j mÞ then depends on f ðXÞ and
mf only, and not directly on X, f andm. To put it more explicitly, Pnþ1X ðf j mÞ only depends on the values that f may assume, and
on the number of times each value has been observed.
We denote by RNe;ri the set of all exchangeable predictive systems that are representation insensitive. It is a subset of the
class RNe of all exchangeable predictive systems, and it inherits the order . Clearly, taking (non-empty) inﬁma preserves rep-
resentation insensitivity, so hRNe;ri;i is a complete semi-lattice as well. We shall see further on in Theorem 6 that these two
structures have the same bottom (the vacuous representation insensitive and exchangeable predictive system).
We are interested in ﬁnding, and studying the properties of, predictive systems that are both exchangeable (and therefore
coherent) and representation insensitive. We believe performing such a study to be quite important, and we report on our
ﬁrst attempts to do so in the rest of this paper.
3.2. The lower probability function
With any predictive system rN , we can associate a map urN deﬁned on the subset fðn;mÞ : 0 6 m 6 n 6 N  1g of N20 by
urN ðn;mÞ :¼ Pnþ1f0;1gðidf0;1g j nm;mÞ:Why this map is important, becomes clear if we look at predictive systems that are representation insensitive. Consider any
proper event ;–A  X, then it follows by applying Eq. (2) with f ¼ IA, thatPnþ1X ðA j mÞ ¼ Pnþ1f0;1gðidf0;1g j nmA;mAÞ;¼ urN ðn;mAÞ; ð3Þwhere mA :¼
P
z2Amz. So we see that in a representation insensitive predictive system, the lower probability urN ðn;mÞ of
observing an event (that is neither considered to be impossible nor necessary) does not depend on the embedding set X
nor on the event itself, but only on the total number of previous observations n, and on the number of timesm that the event
has been observed before. Something similar holds for the upper probability of observing a non-trivial event: by conjugacy,Pnþ1X ðA j mÞ ¼ 1 Pnþ1X ðAc j mÞ ¼ 1 urN ðn;mAc Þ ¼ 1 urN ðn;nmAÞ; ð4Þ
whereAc denotes the set-theoretic complement of the event A. This property6 of representation insensitive predictive systems is
reminiscent of Johnson’s sufﬁcientness postulate [16] (we use Zabell’s terminology [17]), which requires that the probability that
the next observation will be some category x is a function fxðn;mxÞ that depends only on x, on the number of times mx that this
category x has been observed before, and on the total number of previous observations n. Representation insensitivity is stronger:
it entails that the functionurN that ‘corresponds to’ the fx is the same for all categories x in all possible ﬁnite and non-empty setsX.
We call urN the lower probability function of the predictive system rN . To alleviate the notational complexity, we suppress
the index and simply write u, whenever it is clear which predictive system we are talking about. Let us now consider any
predictive system rN that is representation insensitive and exchangeable. We show in the next section that there are such
predictive systems. But ﬁrst we look at a number of interesting properties for the associated lower probability function u.
Proposition 3. Let N > 0 and let rN be a representation insensitive and coherent predictive system with lower probability
function u. Then
1. u is ½0;1-bounded: 0 6 uðn; kÞ 6 1 for all 0 6 k 6 n 6 N  1.
2. u is super-additive in its second argument: uðn; kþ ‘ÞP uðn; kÞ þ uðn; ‘Þ for all non-negative integers n, k and ‘ such that
kþ ‘ 6 n 6 N  1.ther interesting property of the map urN is that it completely determines the values of the predictive system on gambles for those predictive systems
ave the additional property of 2-monotonicity. This is for instance the case of the mixing predictive systems we shall study in Section 5. A thorough and
study of the condition of 2-monotonicity for lower previsions can be found in [14,15].
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4. uðn; kÞP kuðn;1Þ for 1 6 k 6 n 6 N  1, and 0 6 nuðn;1Þ 6 1 for 1 6 n 6 N  1.
5. u is non-decreasing in its second argument: uðn; kþ 1ÞP uðn; kÞ for 0 6 k < n 6 N  1.
If rN is moreover regularly exchangeable, then
6. uðn; kÞP uðnþ 1; kÞ þ uðn; kÞ½uðnþ 1; kþ 1Þ  uðnþ 1; kÞ for 0 6 k 6 n 6 N  2.
7. u is non-increasing in its ﬁrst argument:
uðnþ 1; kÞ 6 uðn; kÞ for 0 6 k 6 n 6 N  2.
8. uðn;1ÞP uðnþ 1;1Þ½1þ uðn;1Þ for 1 6 n 6 N  2.
9. Suppose that uðn;1Þ > 0 and deﬁne sn :¼ 1uðn;1Þ  n for 1 6 n 6 N  1.
Then sn P 0, uðn;1Þ ¼ 1=ðsn þ nÞ and sn is non-decreasing.
The sn that appear in this proposition will later, in Section 5.2, turn out to be constant (independent of the number of
observations n) under special additional assumptions, and will there play the rôle of the hyper-parameter s in the IDMM.
In particular, these results, together with Eqs. (3) and (4), allow us to draw interesting and intuitively appealing conclu-
sions about predictive lower and upper probabilities, which are valid in any representation insensitive and coherent predic-
tive system: (i) the lower probability of observing an event that has not been observed before is zero, and the upper
probability of observing an event that has always been observed before is one (Proposition 3.3); and (ii) if the number of
observations remains ﬁxed, then both the lower and the upper probability of observing an event again do not decrease if
the number of times the event has already been observed increases (Proposition 3.5). In predictive systems that are moreover
regularly exchangeable, we also see that (iii) if the number of times an event has been observed remains the same as the num-
ber of observations increases, then the lower probability for observing the event again does not increase (Proposition 3.7).
When the predictive system we consider consists solely of families of predictive linear previsions (apart perhaps from
predictive lower previsions for dealing with zero previous observations), we can use the additivity of linear previsions, in-
stead of the mere super-additivity of (separately) coherent lower previsions used previously, to get stronger versions of parts
of Proposition 3.
Corollary 4. Consider a representation insensitive and coherent predictive system rN, with a lower probability function u, and
such that all the predictive lower previsions Pnþ1X ð j mÞ for 0 < n 6 N  1 are linear previsions. Then the following statements hold
for all 0 < n 6 N  1:
1. uðn; kþ ‘Þ ¼ uðn; kÞ þ uðn; ‘Þ for all k; ‘P 0 such that kþ ‘ 6 n;
2. uðn; kÞ ¼ kuðn;1Þ for all 0 6 k 6 n.
4. Are there representation insensitive and exchangeable predictive systems?
We have not yet proven that our notions of representation insensitivity and exchangeability for predictive systems are
compatible, or in other words, we do not know yet if there are any predictive systems that are both representation insen-
sitive and exchangeable (let alone regularly so). We remedy this situation here by establishing the existence of two ‘extreme’
types of representation insensitive and exchangeable predictive systems, one of which is also regularly exchangeable.
Consider, for any predictive system rN that is both representation insensitive and exchangeable, the predictive lower pre-
visions for n ¼ 0. These are actually unconditional lower previsions P1X onLðXÞ, modeling our beliefs about the ﬁrst obser-
vation X1, i.e., when no observations have yet been made. It follows right away from Proposition 3 and Eqs. (3) and (4) that
for any proper subset A of X, P1XðAÞ ¼ uð0;0Þ ¼ 0. Since P1X is assumed to be a (separately) coherent lower prevision, Prop-
osition 5 below then guarantees that P1Xðf Þ ¼ min f , for any gamble f on X. So all the P1X in a representation insensitive and
exchangeable predictive system must be so-called vacuous lower previsions.7 This means that there is no choice for the ﬁrst pre-
dictions. It also means that it is impossible to achieve representation insensitivity in any precise predictive system (but see
Theorem 7 further on for a predictive system that comes close).
Proposition 5. Consider an arbitrary non-empty set X. Let P be a coherent lower prevision on LðXÞ such that PðAÞ ¼ 0 for all
A  X. Then P is the vacuous lower prevision on X, meaning that for all gambles f on X, Pðf Þ ¼ inf f .
This leads us to consider the so-called vacuous predictive system mN where all predictive lower previsions are vacuous: for
all 0 6 n 6 N  1, all ﬁnite non-empty sets X, all m 2NnX and all gambles f on X, Pnþ1X ðf j mÞ :¼min f .
Theorem 6. The vacuous predictive system mN is regularly exchangeable and representation insensitive. It is the bottom of the
complete semi-lattice hRNe;ri;i. Its lower probability function is given by uðn;mÞ ¼ 0 for 0 6 m 6 n 6 N  1.7 This result was proven, in another way, by Walley [5, Section 5.5.1], when he argued that his Embedding and Symmetry Principles under coherence only
leave room for the vacuous lower prevision. In the special case that there are no prior observations (n ¼ 0), the Embedding Principle is related to representation
invariance, and the Symmetry Principle to what we have called category permutation invariance.
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n, nor on the observed count vectors m. A subject who is using the vacuous predictive system is not learning anything from
the observations. In particular, we see that representation insensitivity and (regular) exchangeability do not guarantee that
we becomemore committal as we have more information at our disposal. Indeed, with the vacuous predictive system, what-
ever our subject has observed before, he always remains fully uncommittal. If we want a predictive system where something
is really being learned from the data, it seems we need to make some ‘leap of faith’, and add something to our assessments
that is not a mere consequence of exchangeability and representation insensitivity.
Are there less trivial examples of exchangeable and representation insensitive predictive systems? We know that we
must make the vacuous choice for n ¼ 0, but is there, for instance, a way to make the predictive lower previsions precise,
or linear, for n > 0? The following theorem tells us there is only one such predictive system.
Theorem 7. Consider a predictive system where for any 0 < n 6 N  1 all the predictive lower previsions Pnþ1X ð j mÞ are actually
linear previsions Pnþ1X ð j mÞ. If this predictive system is representation insensitive, then8 Thi
for all xPnþ1X ðf j mÞ ¼ Snþ1X ðf j mÞ :¼
X
z2X
f ðzÞmz
n
ð5Þfor all 0 < n 6 N  1, all ﬁnite non-empty sets X, allm 2NnX and all gambles f on X. For its lower probability function u, we then
have uðn; kÞ ¼ kn for all 0 6 k 6 n and n > 0. Moreover, the predictive previsions given by Eq. (5), together with the vacuous
lower previsions for n ¼ 0, constitute a representation insensitive and exchangeable (but not regularly so) predictive system pN.
We call the predictive system pN described in Theorem 7 the Haldane predictive system. The name refers to the fact that a
Bayesian inference model with a multinomial likelihood function using Haldane’s (improper) prior (see, e.g., Jeffreys
[18, p. 123]) would lead to these predictive previsions for n > 0. The fact that the lower probability function of Haldane pre-
dictive system is always uðn; kÞ ¼ kn for all 0 6 k 6 n 6 N  1 and n > 0, together with Corollary 4, implies that statements 6
and 8 in Proposition 3 hold with equality in this case. Moreover, we have sn ¼ 0 for all nP 0. Note that in this case the lower
probability function coincides with the classical frequentist estimation: the (lower and upper) probability for an event that
has been observed k times in n trials is equal to kn.
It is an interesting consequence of Walley’s Marginal Extension Theorem [5, Section 6.7.3] that for any ﬁnite and non-
empty X, the only joint lower prevision on LðXNÞ that is coherent with the Haldane predictive X-family is given by
PNXðgÞ ¼minz2Xgðz; . . . ; zÞ for all gambles g on XN .8 The Haldane predictive system only seems to be coherent with a joint lower
prevision PNX which expresses that our subject is certain that all variables Xk will assume the same value, but where he is com-
pletely ignorant about what that common value is.
This is related to another observation: we deduce from Proposition 3.3 that in the Haldane predictive system, when n > 0
then not only the lower probability but also the upper probability of observing an event that has not been observed before is
zero! This models that a subject is practically certain (because prepared to bet at all odds on the fact) that any event that has
not been observed in the past will not be observed in the future either. The sampling prevision Snþ1X ðf j mÞ for a gamble f in this
predictive system is the expectation of f with respect to the observed (sampling) probability distribution on the set of cat-
egories. The Haldane predictive system is too strongly tied to the observations, and does not allow us to make ‘reasonable’
inferences in a general context. The Haldane and the vacuous predictive systems are both extreme cases: in the latter the
predictive lower previsions are independent of the observed data, and in the former they depend too strongly on them.
5. Mixing predictive systems
We have found two representation insensitive and exchangeable predictive systems, and both are not very useful: the
ﬁrst, because it does not allow learning from past observations, and the second, because its inferences are too strong and
we seem to infer too much from the data. A natural question then is: can we ﬁnd ‘intermediate’ representation insensitive
and exchangeable predictive systems whose behavior is stronger than the vacuous and weaker than the Haldane predictive
system? A simple way to get further models is to look at convex mixtures. Let us, therefore, consider a ﬁnite sequence  of N
numbers n 2 ½0;1, 0 6 n 6 N  1, and study the mixing predictive system rN whose predictive lower previsions are given byPnþ1X ðf j mÞ :¼ nSnþ1X ðf j mÞ þ ð1 nÞmin f ð6Þ
for all 0 6 n 6 N  1, all ﬁnite non-empty sets X, all m 2NnX and all gambles f on X. As Snþ1X ðf j mÞ is only deﬁned for n > 0,
and since representation insensitivity and coherence require that P1X should be vacuous, we always let 0 ¼ 0 implicitly. We
call any such sequence  a mixing sequence, and we denote by u the lower probability function of the corresponding mixing
predictive system rN .
We are mainly interested in ﬁnding mixing predictive systems that are representation insensitive and (regularly)
exchangeable. The following proposition tells us that the only real issue lies with exchangeability. Its immediate proof is based
on the simple observation that representation insensitivity is preserved by taking convex mixtures of any predictive systems.s implies that the Haldane predictive system is not regularly exchangeable: any dominating precise exchangeable predictive system satisﬁes pN1X ðxÞ ¼ 0
2 XN1 such that TXðxÞ ¼ m–ðN  1Þez for all z 2 X, and for any such x, the requirements for regular exchangeability cannot be satisﬁed.
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0 6 k 6 n 6 N  1. Then uðn; kÞ ¼ n kn, and if n > 0 then sn ¼ n 1nn and n ¼ nnþsn. In particular uðn;1Þ ¼ n=n is the lower
probability of observing a non-trivial event that has been observed once before in n trials, n ¼ nuðn;1Þ is the lower probability
uðn;nÞ of observing a non-trivial event that has always been observed before (n out of n times), and sn ¼ 1uðn;nÞuðn;1Þ is the ratio of the
upper probability of observing an event that has never been observed before to the lower probability of observing a non-trivial
event that has been observed once before, in n trials.
We have already argued that, to get away from making vacuous inferences, and to be able to learn from observations, we
need to make some ‘leap of faith’ and go beyond merely requiring exchangeability and representation insensitivity. One of
the simplest ways to do so, it seems, is to specify the numbers uðn;1Þ for n ¼ 1; . . . ;N  1, i.e., to specify, beforehand, the lower
probability of observing any non-trivial event that has been observed only once in n trials. We can then ask for the most conser-
vative representation insensitive predictive system that exhibits these lower probabilities. Interestingly, mixing predictive
systems play this part:
Theorem 9. Consider N > 0 and a mixing sequence . Let rN be a representation insensitive coherent predictive system such that
its associated lower probability function u satisﬁes uðn;1ÞP uðn;1Þ ¼ n=n for all 0 < n 6 N  1. Then rN  rN.
Mixing predictive systems have a special part in this theory, because they are quite simple, and in some sense most con-
servative. They are quite simple because, as Proposition 8 shows, all that is needed to specify them is the values uðn;1Þ of the
lower probability function, or in other words, the lower probabilities that an event will occur that has been observed once in n
observations. Theorem 9 shows they are the most conservative coherent and representation insensitive predictive systems
with the given values for uðn;1Þ. We shall see that there are mixing predictive systems with a non-trivial mixing sequence 
that are also regularly exchangeable. First, we establish a necessary condition on  for this to be the case.
5.1. The regular exchangeability of mixing predictive systems
Consider any mixing sequence  and the corresponding mixing predictive system rN . Let us ﬁrst derive a necessary con-
dition that the n should satisfy for the mixing predictive system to be regularly exchangeable. For the corresponding lower
probability function u it holds by Proposition 8 that uðn; kÞ ¼ n kn; if we substitute this in the inequality of Proposition 3.8
we see that it is necessary for regular exchangeability that the n should satisfyn
n
P
nþ1
nþ 1 1þ
n
n
 
; n ¼ 1; . . . ;N  1: ð7ÞWe deduce from this that if one n is zero, then all of the subsequent nþk are zero as well: if inferences are vacuous after n > 0
observations, they should also remain vacuous after subsequent ones. Or, to put itmore boldly, in regularly exchangeablemix-
ing predictive systems, if we are going to learn at all from observations, we have to start doing so from the ﬁrst observation.
5.2. Predictive inferences for the IDMM
To recover the immediate predictions of the IDMM, it is of particular interest to investigate for which types of mixing pre-
dictive systems, or in other words, for which mixing sequences , we generally have an equality rather than only an inequal-
ity in the condition of Proposition 2, i.e., for whichPnþ1X ðf j mÞ ¼ Pnþ1X ðPnþ2X ðf j mþ eÞ j mÞ; ð8Þ
for all ﬁnite and non-empty X, all 0 6 n 6 N  1, all m 2NnX and all gambles f on X, where the predictive lower previsions
Pnþ1X ð j mÞ are given by Eq. (6). Using the deﬁnition of Snþ1X ðf j mÞ and the (separate) coherence [use (C6) in the Appendix] of
Pnþ1X ð j mÞ, we ﬁnd that this is equivalent to the conditionn
n
¼ nþ1
nþ 1 1þ
n
n
 
; n ¼ 1 . . . ;N  1; ð9Þi.e., where we have the equality in (7). Clearly, one n is zero if and only if all of them are, which leads to the vacuous pre-
dictive system mN . From Theorem 6, we know this vacuous system to be regularly exchangeable (and representation insen-
sitive). If we assume on the other hand that n > 0 for n ¼ 1; . . . ;N, and let fn :¼ n=n ¼ nþ sn P 1, then the above equality
can be rewritten as fnþ1 ¼ fn þ 1, which implies that there is some sP 0 such that fn ¼ nþ s, or equivalently, sn ¼ s and con-
sequently, for n ¼ 0;1; . . . ;N  1:n ¼ nnþ s ; P
nþ1
X ðf j mÞ ¼
n
nþ s S
nþ1
X ðf j mÞ þ
s
nþ s min f : ð10ÞThe predictive lower previsions in Eq. (10) are precisely the ones that can be associated with the Imprecise Dirichlet-Multi-
nomial Model (or IDMM) with hyper-parameter s [4, Section 4.1]. We call mixing predictive systems of this type IDMM-predic-
tive systems. The vacuous predictive system corresponds to letting s !1.
Theorem 10. The vacuous predictive system, and the IDMM-predictive systems for s > 0 are regularly exchangeable and
representation insensitive, and they are the only mixing predictive systems for which the equality (8) holds.
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very peculiar, but in our view intuitively appealing, property of predictive inferences producedby the IDMM. Indeed, assume that
in addition to observing a count vectorm of n observations, we come know in some way that the ðnþ 1Þ-th observation will
belong to a proper subset A ofX, and nothing else—wemight suppose for instance that an observation of Xnþ1 has been made,
but that it is imperfect, and only allows us to conclude that Xnþ1 2 A. Then we can ask what the updated beliefs are, i.e., what
Pnþ1X ðf j m;AÞ is. Since Pnþ1X ðA j mÞ ¼ nmA=n > 0 if and only ifmA > 0 and n > 0, let us assume that indeedmA > 0 and n > 0, in
which case the requirements of coherence allowsus todetermine Pnþ1X ðf j m;AÞuniquely, using the so-calledGeneralizedBayes
Rule [5, Section 6.4] on the conditional lower prevision Pnþ1X ð j mÞ: Pnþ1X ðf j m;AÞ is then the unique real l such thatPnþ1X ðIA½f  l j mÞ ¼ 0: ð11Þ
We then have the following characterization of IDMM-predictive systems, where we denote by fA the restriction of the
gamble f to the set A, by mA the A-tuple obtained from m by dropping the components that correspond to elements outside
A. The sum of the components of mA is mA.
Theorem 11 (Speciﬁcity). The IDMM-predictive systems with s > 0 are the only mixing predictive systems with all n > 0,
n ¼ 1; . . . ;N  1 that satisfy the additional requirementPnþ1X ðf j m;AÞ ¼ PmAþ1A ðfA j mAÞ ð12Þ
for all n ¼ 1; . . . ;N  1, all m 2NnX, all gambles f on X and all proper subsets A of X such that mA > 0.
We ﬁnd the so-called speciﬁcity property of inferences—the term was coined by Bernard [19], who ﬁrst studied this prop-
erty in the context of predictive inference—characterized by Eq. (12) to be quite peculiar. Indeed, suppose that you have ob-
served n successive outcomes, leading to a count vectorm. If you know in addition that Xnþ1 belongs to A, then Eq. (12) tells
you that the updated value Pnþ1X ðf j m;AÞ is the same as the one you would get by discarding all the previous observations produc-
ing values outside A, and in effect only retaining the mA observations that were inside A! It is as if knowing that the ðnþ 1Þth
observation belongs to A allows you to ignore all the previous observations that happened to lie outside A. This is intuitively
appealing, because it means that if you know that the outcome of the next observation belongs to A, only the related behav-
ior (the values of f on A and the previous observations of this set) matter for your prediction.
6. Conclusions
We have considered the problem of representation insensitivity in immediate prediction. We have deﬁned predictive
systems, and the properties we imposed (exchangeability and representation insensitivity) have led us to consider mixing
predictive systems and more speciﬁcally, IDMM-predictive systems (also satisfying Eq. (12)). Much more work is needed,
however, be able to draw a complete picture of the issue of representation insensitivity in predictive systems. Indeed,
while doing research for this paper, we have come across a multitude of questions that we have not yet been able to an-
swer, and we list only a few of them here: (i) Are there (regularly) exchangeable and representation insensitive predictive
systems that are not mixing predictive systems? (ii) Related questions are: Are there (regularly) exchangeable and repre-
sentation insensitive predictive systems that, unlike the mixing systems, are not completely determined by the probabil-
ities uðn;1Þ of observing an event that has been observed only once before in n observations? Are there such predictive
systems whose behavior on gambles, unlike that of mixing systems, is not completely determined by the lower probability
function u? And are there such predictive systems whose lower probability function u, unlike that of mixing systems, is
not additive in the sense that uðn; kþ ‘Þ ¼ uðn; kÞ þ uðn; ‘Þ? (iii) Are there (regularly) exchangeable and representation
insensitive mixing predictive systems that are not of the IDMM-type. i.e., for which the equalities (8) and (9) are not sat-
isﬁed? (iv) Are there (regularly) exchangeable, representation insensitive non-mixing predictive systems that satisfy Eq.
(12)? (v) Can we arrive at stronger conclusions if we consider that the observations Xn make up an inﬁnite exchangeable
sequence? (vi) Can more deﬁnite answers be given if we consider the general, rather than the immediate, prediction
problem?
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Appendix. Proofs of main results
We start by mentioning a few properties of (separately) coherent lower previsions P onLðXÞ, i.e., lower previsions that
satisfy (C1)–(C3). It is easy to check that (C1)–(C3) also imply, for all gambles f and g on X, and all real l:
(C4) Pðf Þ 6 sup f ;
(C5) Pðf Þ 6 PðgÞ if f 6 g ½monotonicity;
(C6) Pðf þ lÞ ¼ Pðf Þ þ l ½constant additivity.
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such that y ¼ px, so it follows from exchangeability that pnXðyÞ ¼ PNXðfyg XNnÞ ¼ PNXðfpxg XNnÞ ¼ PNXðfxg XNnÞ ¼
pnXðxÞ. We next assume pnXðxÞ ¼ pnXðyÞ > 0 to prove that pnþ1X ðz j xÞ ¼ pnþ1X ðz j yÞ for all z 2 X. This follows immediately from
the equalities pnþ1X ðz j xÞpnXðxÞ ¼ pnþ1X ðx; zÞ ¼ pnþ1X ðy; zÞ ¼ pnþ1X ðz j yÞpnXðyÞ, where the second equality again follows by
applying exchangeability. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider anym inNnX, and any x such that TXðxÞ ¼ m. Regular exchangeability tells us that rN is the
inﬁmum of a collection rNc ; c 2 C of exchangeable precise predictive systems. Fix any c in C and consider the corresponding
exchangeable joint linear prevision PNX;c. For any gamble f on X, deﬁne the corresponding gambles g and g
0 on XN by
gðzÞ ¼ f ðznþ1ÞIfxgðz1; . . . ; znÞ and g0ðzÞ ¼ f ðznþ2ÞIfxgðz1; . . . ; znÞ for all z ¼ ðz1; . . . ; zNÞ in XN . Observe that PNX;cðgÞ ¼
Pnþ1X;c ðf j xÞpnX;cðxÞ and thatPNX;cðg0Þ ¼
X
ðynþ1 ;ynþ2Þ2X2
f ðynþ2Þpnþ2X;c ðynþ2 j x; ynþ1Þpnþ1X;c ðynþ1 j xÞpnX;cðxÞ
¼ pnX;cðxÞ
X
ynþ12X
Pnþ2X;c ðf j x; ynþ1Þpnþ1X;c ðynþ1 j xÞ ¼ pnX;cðxÞPnþ1X;c ðPnþ2X;c ðf j x; Þ j xÞ:Since the linear prevision PNX;c is exchangeable, we see that P
N
X;cðgÞ ¼ PNX;cðg0Þ. Hence Pnþ1X;c ðf j xÞ ¼ Pnþ1X;c ðPnþ2X;c ðf j x; Þ j xÞ, since
pnX;cðxÞ > 0, by the assumption of regular exchangeability. Taking the inﬁmum on both sides over all c in C, and invoking reg-
ular exchangeability leads toPnþ1X ðf j xÞ ¼ infc2C P
nþ1
X;c ðf j xÞ ¼ infc2C P
nþ1
X;c ðPnþ2X;c ðf j x; Þ j xÞP infc2C P
nþ1
X;c ðinfc02C P
nþ2
X;c0 ðf j x; Þ j xÞ ¼ Pnþ1X ðPnþ2X ðf j x; Þ j xÞ:Now recall that Pnþ1X ð j xÞ ¼ Pnþ1X ð j mÞ and Pnþ2X ð j x; zÞ ¼ Pnþ2X ð j mþ ezÞ. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Statement 1 follows from (separate) coherence [use (C1) and (C4)]. To prove statement 2, ﬁx
0 6 n 6 N  1 and non-negative k and ‘ such that kþ ‘ 6 n. Consider a set X with three elements a, b and c, then there is
always an m in NnX such that ma ¼ k and mb ¼ ‘ (whence mc ¼ n k ‘P 0). Consider the proper subsets A ¼ fag and
B ¼ fbg of X, then their union A [ B ¼ fa; bg is a proper subset of X and their intersection is empty: A \ B ¼ ;. Now use
the super-additivity of Pnþ1X ð j mÞ [this follows from (C2)] and then representation insensitivity to ﬁnd that indeeduðn; kþ ‘Þ ¼ Pnþ1X ðA [ B j mÞP Pnþ1X ðA j mÞ þ Pnþ1X ðB j mÞ ¼ uðn; kÞ þ uðn; ‘Þ:
Statements 3–5 follow trivially from statements 1 and 2. To prove statement 6, consider a set of categories X ¼ fa; bg. Fix
0 6 k 6 n 6 N  2, and let m 2NnX be such that ma ¼ k and mb ¼ n k. We apply Proposition 2 with f ¼ Ifag to get
Pnþ1X ðfag j mÞP Pnþ1X ðPnþ2X ðfag j mþ eÞ j mÞ. Now deﬁne the gamble g on X by gðaÞ :¼ Pnþ2X ðfag j mþ eaÞ ¼ uðnþ 1; kþ 1Þ
and gðbÞ :¼ Pnþ2X ðfag j mþ ebÞ ¼ uðnþ 1; kÞ, then it is clear from statement 5 that gðaÞP gðbÞ and therefore, using
g ¼ gðbÞ þ ½gðaÞ  gðbÞIfag and the (separate) coherence of Pnþ1X ð j mÞ [use (C3) and (C6)], Pnþ1X ðfag j mÞP
Pnþ1X ðg j mÞ ¼ gðbÞ þ ½gðaÞ  gðbÞPnþ1X ðfag j mÞ. If we now recall that Pnþ1X ðfag j mÞ ¼ uðn; kÞ, we are done. Let us prove state-
ment 7. Observe that for 0 6 k 6 n 6 N  2, uðn; kÞP 0 and uðnþ 1; kþ 1ÞP uðnþ 1; kÞ [by statement 5]. Statement 6 then
implies that indeed uðn; kÞP uðnþ 1; kÞ. To prove 8, apply statement 6 with 1 ¼ k 6 n 6 N  2 to ﬁnd thatuðn;1ÞP uðnþ 1;1Þ þ uðn;1Þ½uðnþ 1;2Þ  uðnþ 1;1Þ
P uðnþ 1;1Þ þ uðn;1Þ½2uðnþ 1;1Þ  uðnþ 1;1Þ ¼ uðnþ 1;1Þ½1þ uðn;1Þ;where the second inequality follows from statement 4. We turn to statement 9. Observe that 1P uðn;nÞP nuðn;1Þ by state-
ment 4, whence 1uðn;1ÞP n and therefore indeed sn P 0. To prove that sn is non-decreasing, apply the inequality in statement 8
for 1 6 n 6 N  2 to get, after division of both sides of the inequality by uðnþ 1;1Þuðn;1Þ: snþ1 þ nþ 1 ¼
1=uðnþ 1;1ÞP 1=uðn;1Þ þ 1 ¼ sn þ nþ 1. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider any gamble f on X, then we have to prove that Pðf Þ ¼ inf f . Since, as a consequence of the
coherence of P [use (C6)], Pðf Þ ¼ inf f þ Pðf  inf f Þ, we only need to prove that PðgÞ ¼ 0, where g is any non-negative gamble
with inf g ¼ 0. For any positive integer n, the set An :¼ fg > 1ng is different from X because inf g ¼ 0, so the assumption
implies that PðAnÞ ¼ 0. Since moreover g 6 1nþ IAn sup g, we deduce from the coherence of P (use (C5), (C3) and (C6)) that
0 6 PðgÞ 6 1n þ PðAnÞ sup g ¼ 1n for all n, whence PðgÞ ¼ 0. 
Proof of Theorem 6. We ﬁrst prove that mN is regularly exchangeable. Consider the collection C of all maps that associate
with any non-empty and ﬁnite set X, some element cðXÞ of fa 2 RXþ :
P
z2Xaz ¼ 1g, where Rþ is the set of (strictly) positive
real numbers. For each c in C, consider the predictive system rNc of predictive linear previsions P
nþ1
X;c ðf j xÞ :¼
P
z2XczðXÞf ðzÞ,
with predictive mass functions pnþ1X;c ðz j xÞ :¼ czðXÞ > 0, z 2 X. Then it is clear that for all x in XN1, pN1X;c ðxÞ ¼QN2
k¼0 p
kþ1
X;c ðxkþ1 j x1; . . . ; xkÞ > 0, and that the vacuous predictive system is the inﬁmum of the collection rNc , c 2 C. The corre-
sponding joint mass functions pNX;c are given by p
N
X;cðxÞ ¼
Q
z2XczðXÞTzðxÞ, x 2 XN . As these only depend on x through TXðxÞ, the
precise predictive systems rNc are exchangeable. Therefore all conditions for regular exchangeability are satisﬁed. That m
N is
representation insensitive, follows immediately from
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nþ1
f ðXÞ idf ðXÞ j mf
 
:The lower probability function for mN satisﬁes uðn;mÞ ¼minr2f0;1gidf0;1gðrÞ ¼ 0, for 0 6 m 6 n 6 N  1. Finally, since the
vacuous lower prevision is point-wise dominated by all linear previsions, the predictive system mN , which consists only of
vacuous lower previsions, is the point-wise smallest coherent predictive system. We deduce that it is the bottom of the
structure hRNe;ri;i. 
Proof of Theorem 7. Consider any ﬁnite and non-empty set of categories X, and let 0 < n 6 N  1 and m 2NnX. It follows
from representation insensitivity and the linearity of Pnþ1X ð j mÞ that for any gamble f on XPnþ1X ðf j mÞ ¼
X
z2X
f ðzÞPnþ1X ðfzg j mÞ ¼
X
z2X
f ðzÞuðn;mzÞ; ð	Þso, taking f to be the constant function 1, it follows that
P
z2Xuðn;mzÞ ¼ 1. Using another consequence of representation
insensitivity and linearity [Corollary 4], we infer that uðn;mzÞ ¼ mzuðn;1Þ, so 1 ¼
P
z2Xmzuðn;1Þ ¼ uðn;1Þ
P
z2Xmz ¼
nuðn;1Þ. We see that uðn;1Þ ¼ 1n for n > 0 and Corollary 4 then implies uðn; kÞ ¼ kn. Substituting this back into Eq. (*) yields
Eq. (5).
We still have to show that pN is exchangeable and representation insensitive. We begin with exchangeability, and
establish that pN is the lower envelope of a speciﬁc collection rNc ; c 2 C of exchangeable systems of predictive linear
previsions. Consider the collection C of all maps c that associate with any ﬁnite and non-empty set X, some particular
element cðXÞ of X. Now deﬁne the predictive system rNc as follows: the predictive linear previsions are given by
P1X;cðf Þ ¼ f ðcðXÞÞ for any f 2LðXÞ, and by Pnþ1X;c ð j mÞ ¼ Snþ1X ð j mÞ [Eq. (5)] for 0 < n 6 N  1. The resulting joint linear
prevision PNX;c has a joint mass function determined by p
N
X;cðcðXÞ; . . . ; cðXÞÞ ¼ 1. It is permutation invariant, and therefore the
predictive system rNc is exchangeable. It is straightforward to check that p
N is indeed the inﬁmum of the collection of
exchangeable precise predictive systems rNc , c 2 C, and is therefore an exchangeable predictive system. To check that it is
representation insensitive, observe that for any gamble f on X and all 0 < n 6 N  1:Snþ1X ðf j mÞ ¼
X
z2X
f ðxÞmz
n
¼
X
r2f ðXÞ
r
P
f ðxÞ¼rmx
n
¼ Snþ1f ðXÞðidf ðXÞ j mf Þ: Proof of Theorem 9. Consider the predictive lower previsions Pnþ1X ð j mÞ that belong to the predictive system rN . For any
non-negative gamble g on X, it follows from the (separate) coherence [use (C2) and (C6)] of Pnþ1X ð j mÞ and representation
insensitivity thatPnþ1X ðg j mÞP
X
z2X
gðzÞPnþ1X ðfzg j mÞ ¼
X
z2X
gðzÞuðn;mzÞand if we use Proposition 3.4 and the assumption, we getPnþ1X ðg j mÞP
X
z2X
gðzÞmzuðn;1ÞP n
X
z2X
gðzÞmz
n
¼ nSnþ1X ðg j mÞ:Again using the (separate) coherence [(C6)] of Pnþ1X ð j mÞ, it follows that for any gamble f on X, since f min f is non-
negative,Pnþ1X ðf j mÞ ¼ min f þ Pnþ1X ðf min f j mÞPmin f þ nSnþ1X ðf min f j mÞ ¼ nSnþ1X ðf j mÞ þ ð1 nÞmin f :If we compare this with Eq. (6), we see that Pnþ1X ð j mÞ point-wise dominates the corresponding predictive lower prevision in
rN , whence indeed r
N
  rN . 
Proof of Theorem 10. Consider the IDMM-predictive system deﬁned by ﬁxing some s > 0 in Eq. (10). From Section 5.2, it only
remains to prove that it is regularly exchangeable. Consider the collection C of all maps that associate with any non-empty
and ﬁnite set X, some element cðXÞ of fa 2 RXþ :
P
z2Xaz ¼ 1g. For each c in C, consider the system rNc of predictive linear
previsionsPnþ1X;c ðf j xÞ ¼
n
nþ s SXðf j TXðxÞÞ þ
s
nþ s
X
z2X
czðXÞf ðzÞ;with predictive mass functionspnþ1X;c ðz j xÞ ¼
TzðxÞ þ sczðXÞ
nþ s > 0; z 2 X:Then it is clear that for all x in XN1, pN1X;c ðxÞ ¼
QN2
k¼0 p
kþ1
X;c ðxkþ1 j x1; . . . ; xkÞ > 0, and that the IDMM-predictive system is the inf-
imum of the collection rNc , c 2 C. It is readily checked that the corresponding joint mass functions pNX;c are given by
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1
N þ s 1
N
  Y
z2X
TzðxÞ þ sczðXÞ  1
TzðxÞ
 
;where rk
  ¼ 1k!Qk1i¼0 ðr  iÞ for real r and k > 0, and r0  ¼ 1. As these only depend on x through TXðxÞ, the precise predictive
systems rNc are exchangeable. Therefore all conditions for regular exchangeability are satisﬁed. h
Proof of Theorem 11. We write down the left-hand side of Eq. (11) using Eq. (6) and n ¼ n=ðnþ snÞ > 0 [see Proposition 8].
Since A is a proper subset of X, this results inPnþ1X ðIA½f  lÞ ¼
n
nþ sn
X
x2A
½f ðxÞ  lmx
n
þ sn
nþ sn minf0;minx2A f ðxÞ  lg
¼ mA
nþ sn
X
x2A
f ðxÞmx
mA
 l
" #
þ sn
nþ sn minf0;minx2A f ðxÞ  lg
¼ mA
nþ sn S
mAþ1
A ðfA j mAÞ  l
h i
þ sn
nþ sn minf0;min fA  lg:This value can only be zero if lPmin fA, so we see that Eq. (11) is equivalent tol ¼ Pnþ1X ðf j m;AÞ ¼
mA
mA þ sn S
mAþ1
A ðfA j mAÞ þ
sn
mA þ sn min fA:Comparing this to PmAþ1A ðfA j mAÞ ¼ mAmAþsmA S
mAþ1
A ðfA j mAÞ þ
smA
mAþsmA
min fA, we see that Pnþ1X ðf j m;AÞ is equal to PmAþ1A ðfA j mAÞ if
and only ifmAðsn  smA Þ
ðmA þ snÞðmA þ smA Þ
SmAþ1A ðfA j mAÞ min fA
h i
¼ 0:We want this equality to hold for all gambles f on all X, all n ¼ 1; . . . ;N  1, all m 2NnX, and all proper subsets A of X such
that mA > 0. It is clear that the condition sn ¼ s for some s > 0 and all n ¼ 1; . . . ;N  1 is sufﬁcient. To show that it is also
necessary, ﬁx n 2 f2; . . . ;N  1g and choose X ¼ fa; b; cg, A ¼ fa; bg, a gamble f on X such that f ðaÞ > f ðbÞ ¼ 0, and
m 2NnX such that ma ¼ n 1, mb ¼ 0 and mc ¼ 1. Then the condition above becomes ðn1Þðsnsn1Þðsnþn1Þðsn1þn1Þ f ðaÞ ¼ 0, or in other
words sn ¼ sn1. hReferences
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